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A B S T R A C T
MPCs were directly elicited from a representative sample of UK adults in July 2020 using receipt of a
hypothetical unanticipated, one-time income payment. Reported MPCs are modest, around 11% on average.
They are higher, but still modest, for individuals in households with high current needs. Significant fractions
of respondents report they would use a windfall to pay down debt, or that they would change their transfer
payments to or from family and friends. The latter means that the aggregate MPC out of a stimulus payment
need not equal the population-average MPC.. Introduction
Governments often respond to recessions and economic crises with
easures to stimulate household consumption spending. These include
argeted reductions in VAT, expansions in the coverage and generosity
f welfare benefits, and direct stimulus payments to individuals or
ouseholds. The propensity of individuals and households to increase
onsumption spending out of any transitory increase in income (the
arginal propensity to consume or MPC) is a key policy variable
etermining the effectiveness of many of these measures, and of direct
timulus payments in particular.
The aim of this paper is to understand how consumers react to fiscal
timulus during an economic crisis (the COVID-19 pandemic). It has
een argued that the MPC out of a one-off payment may be particularly
igh during the pandemic because earnings falls have been particularly
arge (Alon et al., 2020). We distinguish between responses through
ncreased spending, through saving and debt reduction and through
rivate transfers to others.
We draw on a large-scale, high-quality panel survey of individuals
onducted during the COVID pandemic in the United Kingdom to
haracterize the level and distribution of MPCs across UK adults. The
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H. Low).
fourth wave of this survey in July 2020 included questions directly
eliciting the MPC: individuals were asked how they would respond to
a hypothetical unanticipated and one-time payment of £500 ($640).
Those who reported they would not spend the entire windfall were
asked about alternative uses of the payment. Further, the COVID sample
is based on the long-running Understanding Society panel and so we
combine data on how individuals have fared during the crisis with
panel data on economic position prior to the pandemic.
Theory suggests that the MPC out of transitory income will either
be close to zero or close to one (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010). For
unconstrained consumers, who have many periods left to live and who
face little uncertainty, the increase in consumption should be roughly
equal to the annuitised value of the increase in lifetime income, which
will typically be near zero (≈ 𝑟∕(1 + 𝑟) where 𝑟 is the interest rate). By
contrast, consumers who face binding constraints on borrowing, and
have little liquid wealth, would be expected to have MPCs close to
one (Kaplan and Violante, 2014). Models of precautionary savings, in
which consumers are both highly impatient and highly risk averse, pre-
dict high MPCs for consumers who are below their target ‘buffer-stock’
of savings (Carroll, 1997).https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubecp.2021.100005
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As predicted by theory, we find that most individuals report either
hat they would make small or zero changes in spending in response to
he hypothetical payment, or that they would spend the full amount.
1% of individuals report they would not increase spending at all
n the three months following receipt of the additional £500. 7% of
ndividuals report they would spend the full amount. This translates
nto an average MPC of 11p for each £1. Few observable characteristics
re strongly associated with MPC heterogeneity but we do find higher
verage MPCs for the college educated and those who do not own their
omes outright.
There is also important heterogeneity in the use of unspent funds:
f the 93% who reported they would not spend the full amount, 66%
f individuals reported they would use the payment to increase savings
nd 22% would use the payment to reduce debts. This heterogeneity is
ore strongly associated with observable characteristics. Respondents
ith children, those who do not own their housing outright, those who
ere not regular savers in the past, those in financial arrears, and those
xpecting future financial difficulties are more likely to report they
ould use the extra funds to pay down debt, and are less likely to
eport that they would increase saving. In other words, those in more
inancially fragile situations would use the payments to pay down debt.
An important and novel feature of the survey is that it explores
ow private transfers between households are affected by the receipt
f the extra income. Individuals were asked if they would reduce or
ncrease transfers to other households following receipt of the payment.
% of individuals report that they would give more and 3% report
hey would receive less. The crowding out of private support is higher
mong those in the lowest income quintile, and this highlights the
otential interaction of windfall income gains with transfer behaviour.
This paper contributes to a literature estimating how individuals
espond to one-off income payments, and the extent of heterogeneity in
esponses across individuals. This literature includes the direct elicita-
ion of the MPC using either hypothetical scenarios (Drescher et al.,
020; Bunn et al., 2018; Sahm et al., 2012; Jappelli and Pistaferri,
014; Fuster et al., 2021; Christelis et al., 2019; Jappelli and Pistaferri,
020) as well as questions about responses to past or future windfalls
such as tax rebates, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003), Broda and
arker (2014)). Alternative approaches have used income and spending
ata in conjunction with natural experiments (such as differences in the
iming of receipt of tax rebates and stimulus cheques (Johnson et al.,
006; Parker et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2020), lottery wins (Fagereng
t al., 2018)), or wealth shocks (Christelis et al., 2015)), or statistical
ecompositions of income shocks and covariance restrictions on the
oint distributions of income and consumption growth (Blundell et al.,
008).
A small number of papers estimate MPCs during the current
andemic-induced recession. Baker et al. (2020) use spending data
o estimate the impact of stimulus payments made in the U.S. in
pril 2020. They find that each $1 received resulted in increases
n spending of 0.25 cents when their sample is weighted using the
urrent Population Survey. Again in the U.S., Coibion et al. (2020) use
irect elicitation and find that 15% of respondents ‘‘mostly spent’’ their
timulus cheques. Christelis et al. (2020) find MPCs for nondurables
round 0.3–0.5 for hypothetical windfalls of e3000 in a survey of six
urozone countries conducted between April and October 2020.
There are two main contributions of our paper. First, it is unique
n the broad MPC literature in showing that some consumers would
espond to a one-time income payment by transferring more to friends
nd family, and that others would have support from friends and
amily reduced. This implies that targeting of payments to high-MPC
ndividuals could be partly undone by private transfers. Further, this
mplies that the aggregate MPC out of a stimulus payment need not
qual the population-average MPC, even if all individuals receive the
ame payment.
Second, our paper differs from much of the MPC literature in that we
stimate MPCs in a time of a severe crisis, when MPCs may be different a
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and when fiscal stimulus packages are most likely to be deployed. The
crucial difference between our paper and the others that measured
MPCs in 2020 is that those papers evaluate MPCs out of stimulus checks
distributed during the first wave of infection when there were many
restrictions on spending. In contrast, our data (the July 2020 wave
of the Understanding Society COVID-19 study) were collected after the
first wave of the pandemic, during a period when the UK had come
out of lockdown and many social-distancing, travel and commercial
restrictions had been lifted.
Despite this, our average estimated MPCs are low compared to the
average MPCs from most of the literature cited above, which typically
report MPCs around 0.3–0.5. In our concluding section, we discuss pos-
sible explanations for this finding, and implications for policy responses
to the pandemic and other economic crisis.
2. Data and methods
2.1. Understanding society COVID-19 web survey
This paper is based on data collected in the fourth wave of the Un-
derstanding Society COVID-19 Study (Institute for Social and Economic
Research (2020a); henceforth COVID-19 Study), fielded in late July of
2020. The UK went into ‘‘lockdown’’ on 23rd March. By July, the first
peak of the pandemic had passed in the UK. The retail and hospitality
industries had reopened as had domestic and some international travel.
The UK economy contracted substantially in March and April, but
began to grow again in May. GDP grew 6.4% in July but was still
11% down on February (Office for National Statistics (2020a)). In
terms of economic support policies, the UK government introduced
the Job Retention Scheme on March 20th, soon followed by the Self-
Employment Support Scheme. Both policies were still in place in July.
July saw the announcement of the ‘‘eat out to help out’’ scheme (a
subsidy to restaurant meals) though this did not come into effect until
the start of August. July also saw the introduction of a temporary cut in
VAT specific to the hospitality and domestic tourism industries which
took effect from the 15th of the month.1
The COVID-19 study is a new component of Understanding Society :
the UK Household Longitudinal Study (henceforth Main Study). Under-
standing Society (University of Essex Institute for Social and Economic
Research and NatCen Social Research and Kantar Public, 2019) is the
UK’s main longitudinal Household Survey, and a sister study to the
PSID in the U.S. and the GSOEP in Germany, among others. The Main
Study began in 2009 and attempts to interview all adults in sample
households annually using a mixed mode design.2 The COVID-19 Study
began in April 2020 and uses more frequent web surveys to capture
the experiences and behaviour of Main Study participants during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The fact that the COVID-19 Study is based on the Understanding
Society Main Study has several key advantages. First, the COVID-19
Study inherits the properties of the Main Study that ensure reliable
population inferences. Second, data collected in the COVID-19 Study
can be linked to data on the same participants, and their households,
collected in past waves of the Main Study. Data from earlier waves
of the Main Study provides context for the COVID-19 Study, and for
modelling nonresponse to the COVID-19 Study. All members of the
Main Study who, in April 2020, belonged to active households and were
aged sixteen or over were eligible for the COVID-19 Study.3
1 The temporary cut was from 20% to 5% and was announced to last until
arly January 2021.
2 Understanding Society carried on from and incorporates the sample of the
arlier British Household Panel survey which ran from 1991 to 2008.
3 The July 2020 wave was issued to all of these individuals except those
ho attrited from the Main Study after Wave 9 but prior to April 2020, and
hose that had adamantly refused to participate in the COVID-19 Study (either
fter the initial invitation, or at an earlier wave). A total of 36,268 individuals








































































Our analysis focuses on those who had previously responded to
ave 9 of the Main Study. For this group, the response rate was
9%. Because data collection was restricted to web mode, and the
ieldwork period was short, this response rate is significantly below
hat is achieved in the Main Study, though not out of line with other
eb studies. However, very rich background information is available
rom the Main Study on both respondents and nonrespondents. This
llows for very careful modelling of nonresponse. A Post-Lasso pro-
edure is used to select predictors of response from a very large set
f candidate variables and to estimate the inverse-probability weights
hat are provided with the data. Many other surveys correct for non-
esponse with simple calibration weights based on a small number of
bservables such as age, gender and education. In contrast, the Main
tudy contains information such frequency of internet use, which is a
trong predictor of web survey response.4 The Main Study also provides
opulation targets that can be used to test the ability of the COVID-19
tudy weights to eliminate nonresponse biases. Both the development
nd testing of the inverse-probability weights is described in detail
n Crossley et al. (2021b) and Benzeval et al. (2021). Those papers
emonstrated the inverse-probability weights developed for the COVID-
9 are very effective at removing nonresponse biases, and that they
ignificantly outperform simple calibration weights.
.2. Sample and covariates
We use a sample of 11,223 individuals who had positive Wave 9
ample weights, for whom COVID-19 sample weights can be derived.
e then exclude from our analysis 248 individuals who did not provide
n answer to the initial MPC question. This gives a final analysis sample
f 10,975 individuals.
To explore heterogeneity in spending responses, we focus primarily
n characteristics measured in the Main Study, prior to the pandemic.
n addition to demographics (age, gender, education, family type), we
ook at several measures of financial position. We created an income
easure which assigns respondents to quintiles of household income
here household incomes were collected prior to COVID in 2017-18
wave 9). Income includes earned and unearned income, net of tax
nd inclusive of any benefits received and is equivalized by household
omposition. We also look at whether the individual lives in housing
hich is owned outright (so that there are neither mortgage nor rental
ayments).
In addition to these pre-COVID variables, we use six covariates from
he July wave of the COVID study, which are therefore potentially
o-determined with the spending response. The first is whether the
ndividual reduced their working hours, or lost their job during the
andemic prior to July 2020. The second is about individuals’ saving
ehaviour:5 we group individuals according to whether they are current
avers and whether they reported saving in the 2018–2019 wave of
he Main Study (‘‘new saver’’, ‘‘was saver’’, ‘‘never saver’’ and ‘‘always
aver’’). The third is whether individuals are currently in arrears on
ousehold bills, mortgage rent or council tax. The fourth is whether
he individual expects financial difficulties over the next three months.
were invited to participate in the July wave, and invitations were sent by email
and/or SMS text message, or by post. Respondents were offered a small incen-
tive to participate. The seven-day fieldwork period opened on July 24th, and
reminders were sent on days 2, 3 and 6. The web questionnaire was designed
to take approximately 20 min to complete. Further details about the COVID-19
Study fieldwork can be found in Institute for Social and Economic Research
(2020).
4 As one example, the New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations,
studied by Fuster et al. (2021), response rates hover around 55%. However,
the weights provided in that survey calibrate only to population totals on age,
income, education and region.
5 Savers are those who answered affirmatively to the question ‘‘Do you save
any amount of your income, for example by putting something away now and then
in a bank, building society, or Post Office account, other than to meet regular bills?’’. l
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Respondents were asked On a scale of 0%–100% how likely do you think
it is that you will have difficulty paying your usual bills and expenses in
the next three months?. We group responses to this question into two
categories (0, 1-100). The three month period that these expectations
are defined over coincides with the timing of the spending questions
discussed below. The final covariates are whether individuals are cur-
rently ‘shielding’ to avoid infection risk (individuals identified as at risk
of severe risk of coronavirus by the National Health Service were asked
to stay at home where possible, even as restrictions were relaxed for
the general population) and about individuals’ expectations of catching
COVID over the next month.
The first two columns of Table 1 show the distribution of these
covariates in our sample, both unweighted and weighted. This high-
lights the importance of using the appropriate weights, as discussed in
detail in Crossley et al. (2021b). A comparison of the weighted and
unweighted statistics reveals that women, those over the state pension
age, and those with a degree are over-represented in the unweighted
data. The estimates suggest that about a third of the population own
their homes outright. In July of 2020 just over a third expected fi-
nancial difficulties over the next three months. Less than 10% were
shielding due to health vulnerabilities and more than 90% of the
population considered themselves unlikely or very unlikely to contract
COVID-19.
2.3. Measuring the marginal propensity to consume
The July 2020 wave of the COVID-19 Study includes new questions
designed to directly elicit respondents’ MPC. The exact wording of the
questions is given in the Appendix. Respondents are asked to consider
a hypothetical situation in which they receive an unexpected and one-
time payment of £500 on the day they are completing the survey.6
They were first asked if this would lead them to spend more, less or
the same over the next three months. If they responded either more
or less, a second question asked quantitatively how much more or
less.7 Much of the previous literature only asks for qualitative responses
‘‘mostly spend’’, ‘‘mostly save’’ etc. as in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995,
003, 2009b)). An obvious advantage of our approach is that it allows
s to directly calculate the value of the MPC for different individuals
ather than having to infer it. In terms of the hypothetical payment, the
uestions in the COVID-19 are most similar to questions asked in the
ew York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations analysed by Fuster
t al. (2021).8
Two further aspects of the MPC questions bear noting. First, the
uestions ask about total spending, rather than just about nondurable
onsumption spending. While some studies, such as Christelis et al.
2019), separate durable and nondurable spending, this is rare in the
iterature. Moreover, from the point of view of fiscal stimulus, total
pending (including on durables) is the measure of primary interest
o policy makers. Second, our questions are explicit about the time-
orizon over which additional spending will occur (the next three
onths). This is likely to be the time-frame of most interest to pol-
cymakers. Questions that are not explicit about the time-frame may
apture longer-run spending responses that are less relevant for short
erm stimulus policies.9
6 About $640 at the time of the survey.
7 As noted above, some of the previous literature asks about a real-world
indfall (such as a tax rebate as in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995)) rather than
hypothetical payment.
8 Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) ask for a quantitative amount spent, but
o so directly, without a preliminary categorical question, or allowance for
egative amounts.
9 A limitation of the data is that it only considers gains. The MPC out of
ains is of course the relevant parameter for policy makers considering direct
ncome payments to consumers as a fiscal stimulus measure. However, some
ast research has found that larger MPCs are elicited when considering income
osses (Bunn et al., 2018; Fuster et al., 2021).
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Summary statistics.
Sample means How would spending change? MPCs
Unweighted Weighted Increase Same Mean ≥ 0.9
Gender: Men 0.42 0.48 0.21 0.73 0.12 0.08
Women 0.58 0.52 0.17 0.76 0.10 0.07
Age: 19–65 0.71 0.78 0.21 0.72 0.12 0.09
66+ 0.29 0.22 0.12 0.84 0.06 0.03
Education: GCSE or lower 0.29 0.37 0.17 0.74 0.09 0.06
A-level 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.75 0.09 0.06
Degree 0.50 0.40 0.21 0.75 0.13 0.09
Family type: Couple, child 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.68 0.15 0.11
Couple, no child 0.49 0.38 0.15 0.81 0.08 0.05
Single, child 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.59 0.16 0.11
Single, no child 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.74 0.11 0.07
Housing: Not owned 0.56 0.67 0.22 0.70 0.13 0.09
Owned 0.44 0.33 0.13 0.84 0.07 0.04
Income quintile: q1 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.67 0.11 0.07
q2 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.72 0.10 0.07
q3 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.74 0.11 0.08
q4 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.77 0.12 0.08
q5 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.80 0.11 0.08
Labour shock: No shock 0.88 0.87 0.18 0.75 0.11 0.07
Hours loss 0.09 0.10 0.23 0.70 0.12 0.07
Job loss 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.76 0.07 0.05
Saver: Never saver 0.32 0.37 0.21 0.70 0.11 0.08
New saver 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.77 0.11 0.08
Always saver 0.37 0.33 0.16 0.80 0.10 0.06
Was saver 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.76 0.11 0.08
Arrears: In arrears 0.06 0.10 0.23 0.58 0.13 0.09
Up-to-date 0.94 0.90 0.18 0.76 0.11 0.07
Chance financial difficulty: 0% 0.71 0.63 0.16 0.80 0.10 0.07
> 0 & ≤ 100% 0.29 0.37 0.23 0.65 0.13 0.08
COVID shielding: Shielding 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.78 0.08 0.05
Not shielding 0.94 0.92 0.19 0.74 0.11 0.08
Expects to get COVID: Likely 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.70 0.13 0.09
Unlikely 0.60 0.59 0.20 0.74 0.12 0.08
Very unlikely 0.37 0.36 0.16 0.77 0.09 0.06
All (weighted) – – 0.19 0.75 0.11 0.07
All (unweighted) – – 0.17 0.78 0.10 0.07
Notes: Sample size (‘All’) is 10,975 in columns 1-4 and 10,759 in columns 5-6. Statistics are weighted for nonresponse except where otherwise noted. MPCs are calculated on
the basis of questions asking if spending would change upon receipt of £500 and by how much. MPCs are trimmed to be at least zero and at most one. Income quintiles are of
household incomes that were collected in 2017-18 (wave 9) and are equivalised using the OECD modified scale. The variables ‘Labour shock’, ‘arrears’, ‘expects financial difficulties’,
‘COVID shielding’ and ‘expects to get COVID’ are collected in the July 2020 survey. The ‘Labour shock’ categories are defined according to changes between February and July
2020, where an hours loss is defined as working positive hours in February and being employed but working zero hours in July. ‘Saver’ categories are defined according to saving
behaviour in 2018–19 (wave 10) and July 2020. ‘COVID shielding’ refers to being identified as someone at risk of severe illness from coronavirus by the NHS. ‘Expects to get
COVID’ has a reference period of the next month, while ‘expects financial difficulties’ has a reference period of the next three months.A perennial issue with questions about hypothetical windfalls is
that consumers stated responses may differ from their true spending
responses, as measured in studies such as Parker et al. (2013) and Baker
et al. (2020). Parker and Souleles (2019) find that those with higher
self-reported propensities to consume out of stimulus checks increased
their spending by more when their stimulus checks were actually
received.
If the categorical and quantitative questions about spending in-
dicated that the respondent would not spend the full £500, a final
question asked what they would do with the unspent amount. Options
included paying off debt, saving, giving more financial help to friends
and family; and additionally, whether they would receive less financial
help from friends or family. These latter options capturing private
transfers in response to transfer payments are a novel addition to the
literature that directly elicits MPCs. Further, private transfers seem to
be an important way in which individuals have dealt with economic
shocks associated with the pandemic in the UK. Crossley et al. (2021b)
show that 12.5% of working age adults reported receiving a private
transfer over the first two waves of the COVID-19 Study (covering
April and May, 2020), more than reported new borrowing or new
benefit claims. Moreover, the incidence of such transfers was much4
higher for some groups. For example, 40% of single parents reported
receiving a private transfer in this period. Thus the potential interaction




The penultimate row in the central panel of Table 1 reports the
fraction of individuals receiving an additional £500 that would increase
spending, keep spending the same or decrease spending. While this ‘ex-
tensive margin’ response does not estimate the MPC, it provides a clear
indication of individuals’ intentions, and the extent of heterogeneity
across groups. Further, this extensive margin is likely to be less subject
to measurement error. Overall, only 19% of individuals report that
they would spend more. 75% report that they would not change their
spending. 7% reported that they would spend less.10
10 It may be surprising to see a fraction spending less, but this is similar
to the proportion who reported they would spend less in response to a cash
windfall in Fuster et al. (2021), where 6% reported they would spend less.









































Fig. 1. Histogram of MPCs Notes: Sample size is 10,759. Statistics are weighted for
onresponse. MPCs are calculated on the basis of questions asking if spending would
hange upon receipt of £500 and by how much. MPCs are trimmed to be at least zero
nd at most one.
The penultimate column of Table 1 shows average MPCs. These
ombine both the intensive and extensive margins of response. An
ndividual’s MPC is calculated as the elicited consumption change
ivided by £500. MPCs are capped to be between zero and one. This
eans, for example, that we have re-coded as having MPCs of zero
hose individuals who reported that they would spend less as a result of
he £500. On average each £1 increase in income results in an increase
n spending of 11p. This is to the low end of figures reported in the
iterature. For example, Drescher et al. (2020) report country-average
PCs in Europe that range from 32.9% to 57.3% with an overall
ean of 46.9%. The last row of Table 1 also reports the fraction who
ould increase spending and average reported MPC without weights.
lthough, as noted above, the weights do significantly adjust the socio-
emographic composition of the sample, weighting raises the average
PC only from 0.10 to 0.11, and the fraction that would increase
pending at all from 0.17 to 0.19. Given that the correction for selection
n a very rich set of observables leads to such a small change in the
verage MPC, it is unlikely that any residual selection on unobservables
ould lead to a significantly larger average MPC.
Substantial heterogeneity underlies the average MPC. Fig. 1 shows
he full distribution of report MPCs in our sample. Consistent with
he theory outlined in the introduction, individuals tend to either
eport low MPCs (below 0.1) or high MPCs (above 0.9) with very few
ndividuals reporting intermediate values: 85% have an MPC of 0; 7%
ave an MPC of 1 and would spend the full amount of the windfall.
Table 1 also shows how spending responses vary by observable
haracteristics. Reported intention to spend a windfall, and higher
PCs, are associated with being of retirement age, the presence of
hildren, and not owning one’s home outright (and so obliged to make
ither rent or mortgage payments). However, we do not find an average
PC above 15% in any subgroup.
.2. Exploring MPC heterogeneity
Table 2 reports results from regressions of MPCs on multiple char-
cteristics. Given the bi-modal nature of the data, we report both
LS models of the individual MPC, and probit models for a binary
ndicator for whether individuals report a high MPC (0.9 or above). In
oth cases we report three specifications. The first includes sociodemo-
raphic characteristics measured pre-COVID. The second adds long-run
ncome quintiles, again measured pre-COVID (in the Main Study). In
he third specification we include variables for changes in individuals’
ircumstances over the pandemic which may be co-determined with
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MPCs. The only robust and statistical significant results in Table 2
are that those with degrees and those that do not own their homes
outright tend to have higher MPCs. We find no evidence that those with
lower long-run incomes have higher MPCs after conditioning on other
demographics. This is at odds with the theoretical prediction that MPCs
are greater for poorer individuals. However, previous studies have also
found either no clear relationship between MPCs and income (Shapiro
and Slemrod, 1995) or that poorer individuals have lower MPCs than
the rich (Sahm et al., 2012). Another theoretical prediction is that
MPCs should be greater for ‘hand-to-mouth’ individuals with low liquid
wealth (Kaplan and Violante, 2014). While we do not observe liquid
wealth stocks directly, we observe several proxies (saving behaviour,
whether individuals are in arrears and whether individuals expect
financial difficulties). However, none of these variables are correlated
with the MPCs individuals report. Fuster et al. (2021) also note that the
search for observable correlates of MPC heterogeneity has yielded few
robust results.
3.3. The uses of unspent payments
In Table 3, we take the sample of those who have an MPC of
less than one, and analyse the use of the money that is not spent.
Respondents were asked if, on receipt of a £500 payment, they would
pay off debt, save more, give more financial help to friends and family,
or receive less financial help from friends or family (respondents were
invited to indicate all that apply). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report
the fractions who would reduce debt and the fraction who would save.
Columns 3 and 4 report the hypothetical effect of an unexpected one-
time income receipt on financial transfers to and from family and
friends. The single most reported use of unspent payments is saving,
which was indicated by 66% of the 93% of respondents with MPCs less
than one (or 61% overall), but 22% reported they would pay down
debt. Crossley et al. (2021b) shows that financial assistance between
friends and family has been an important mechanism by which people
in the UK have coped with financial hardship associated with the
pandemic: 15% of households received transfers from friends in the
three months after March 2020, and 12% made such transfers. Table 3
shows that 9% report an increase in the transfers they would make, and
3% of people report that their financial transfers would be reduced by
the £500 payment.
There are substantial differences in the reported use of unspent
receipts by observable characteristics. Lower income individuals are
more likely to report reducing debts: 26% of those in the lowest income
quintile report they would pay down debt compared to 18% in the
richest quintile. Further, lower income individuals are less likely to
report saving any of the additional funds (53% of those in the bottom
quintile compared to 73% in the top quintile). Those with children are
also much more likely to report paying down debt than those without,
as are those who do not own their homes outright or who rent, and
those of working age individuals relative to those of retirement age.
Single parents and those in the lowest income quintiles are most likely
to receive reduced private transfers: in other words, the additional
income payment crowds out private support. Those over 66 or owning
their own home are most likely to report that they would use the
payment to give more financial support to friends or family.
To further explore these associations, we ran probit regressions of
binary indicators for different uses of any unspent funds on individual
characteristics. There are reported in Table 4. For each outcome, we
report two specifications. The first specification includes characteris-
tics measured pre-COVID only, including long run income quintile.
The second includes variables capturing individuals’ circumstances and
expectations in July 2020.
All else equal, working age individuals, those with children and
those who do not own their homes outright (including renters) are more
likely to use unspent funds to reduce debt. These same groups are also
less likely to report saving unspent funds, with the exception of those













OLS Probit ≥ 0.9
Female −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 19–65 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GCSE or lower 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Degree 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Couple, child 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Couple, no child −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Single, child 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Home not owned outright 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income q1 0.00 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Income q2 −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Income q4 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Income q5 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Hours loss −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Job loss −0.03 −0.02
(0.02) (0.01)
Never saver 0.00 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
New saver −0.00 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Always saver −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.01)
In arrears −0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)




Likely get COVID −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
Very unlikely get COVID −0.02∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 10507 10507 9691 10507 10507 9691
Notes: Columns 1–3 contain OLS coefficient estimates and columns 4–6 contain marginal effects from probit models for a discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1 (col 3–4). Regressions are weighted for nonresponse. Standard errors in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001. Omitted categories are:
male; age 66+; educated to a-level; single with no child; income quintile three; ‘no (labour market) shock’; ‘never saver’; ‘not in arrears’, ‘0% chance of financial
difficulty’, ‘not shielding’ and ‘unlikely to get COVID’. MPCs are calculated on the basis of questions asking if spending would change upon receipt of £500 and
by how much. MPCs are trimmed to be at least zero and at most one. Income quintiles are of household incomes that were collected in 2017-18 (Wave 9) and
are equivalised using the OECD modified scale. The variables ‘Labour shock’, ‘arrears’, ‘expects financial difficulties’, ‘COVID shielding’ and ‘expects to get COVID’
are collected in the July 2020 survey. The ‘Labour shock’ categories are defined according to changes between February and July 2020, where an hours loss is
defined as working positive hours in February and being employed but working zero hours in July. ‘Saver’ categories are defined according to saving behaviour
in 2018–19 (wave 10) and July 2020. ‘COVID shielding’ refers to being identified as someone at risk of severe illness from coronavirus by the NHS. ‘Expects to







f working age. Those of working age, those in the bottom income
uintile and those who do not own their homes are more likely to report
hat the receipt of funds would lead to reduced transfers from other
ouseholds, and that they would increase transfers to other households.
urning to covariates measured in July 2020, those who do not report
aving, those currently in arrears and those expecting future financial
ifficulties are more likely to use their unspent funds to reduce debts
and less likely to use these funds to increase savings). Those expecting
inancial difficulties and those who are no longer saving are more likely
o see a decline in transfers from other households. Those who reduced6
heir hours worked are significantly less likely to transfer unspent funds
o other households.
. Discussion
One policy option to boost spending during COVID is a lump-sum
ncome transfer, or alternatively a tax credit, that is paid to households.
his was carried out in the US with payments received in April–May
020 (Coibion et al., 2020). In this paper, we provide evidence on
he implications for private spending in the UK of making such a
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Use of amount not spent (if any not spent)
Reduce Debt Save Give More Receive Less
All spending <£500 0.22 0.66 0.09 0.03
All spending <£500 (unweighted) 0.20 0.68 0.10 0.02
Gender: Men 0.21 0.68 0.07 0.02
Women 0.23 0.64 0.10 0.03
Age: 19–65 0.26 0.64 0.07 0.03
66+ 0.08 0.71 0.16 0.01
Education: GCSE or lower 0.22 0.62 0.09 0.03
A-level 0.23 0.68 0.08 0.03
Degree 0.21 0.68 0.10 0.02
Family type: Couple, child 0.35 0.57 0.05 0.03
Couple, no child 0.14 0.71 0.11 0.02
Single, child 0.44 0.42 0.07 0.06
Single, no child 0.19 0.69 0.09 0.03
Housing (2018–19): Not owned 0.29 0.61 0.06 0.04
Owned 0.08 0.74 0.14 0.01
Income quintile (2018–19): q1 0.26 0.53 0.11 0.07
q2 0.24 0.63 0.10 0.03
q3 0.25 0.66 0.07 0.01
q4 0.19 0.70 0.08 0.02
q5 0.18 0.73 0.09 0.00
Labour shock: No shock 0.21 0.66 0.10 0.02
Hours loss 0.29 0.63 0.05 0.04
Job loss 0.23 0.62 0.08 0.07
Saver: Never saver 0.31 0.51 0.09 0.05
New saver 0.21 0.74 0.09 0.01
Always saver 0.13 0.79 0.09 0.00
Was saver 0.21 0.67 0.09 0.04
Arrrears: In arrears 0.51 0.33 0.07 0.07
Up to date 0.19 0.69 0.09 0.02
Expects financial difficulty: 0% chance 0.14 0.72 0.10 0.01
> 0 & ≤ 100% chance 0.36 0.55 0.07 0.06
COVID shielding: Shielding 0.17 0.61 0.14 0.04
Not shielding 0.22 0.66 0.09 0.03
Expects to get COVID: Likely 0.30 0.60 0.10 0.06
Unlikely 0.23 0.66 0.08 0.03
Very unlikely 0.19 0.66 0.10 0.03
Notes: Sample size (‘All’) is 9,844. Statistics are weighted for nonresponse. Respondents can report multiple uses, so the columns do not sum
to one. Income quintiles are of household incomes that were collected in 2017-18 (wave 9) and are equivalised using the OECD modified
scale. The variables ‘Labour shock’, ‘arrears’, ‘expects financial difficulties’, ‘COVID shielding’ and ‘expects to get COVID’ are collected in the
July 2020 survey. The ‘Labour shock’ categories are defined according to changes between February and July 2020, where an hours loss is
defined as working positive hours in February and being employed but working zero hours in July. ‘Saver’ categories are defined according to
saving behaviour in 2018–19 (wave 10) and July 2020. ‘COVID shielding’ refers to being identified as someone at risk of severe illness from
coronavirus by the NHS. ‘Expects to get COVID’ has a reference period of the next month, while ‘expects financial difficulties’ has a reference
period of the next three months.payment in the middle of the pandemic by directly eliciting marginal
propensities to consume from individuals in the UK in July 2020.
Individuals were asked how their spending would change in response
to an unexpected one-time payment of £500 payment.
Our key conclusion is that the fraction of households that would
spend part of such a payment is low: only 19% say they would increase
spending at all as a result. Further, the percentage of payments that
would be spent, as measured by marginal propensities to consume, is
very small at 11% on average, and we do not find an average MPC
above 15% for any socioeconomic group.
The permanent income hypothesis predicts small spending responses
to transitory income shocks. One straightforward interpretation of our
results is that the majority of individuals behave in a way consistent
with this theory. However, the average MPC we find is much lower
than that reported in other studies that directly elicit MPCs. It is natural
to ask why this is the case. MPCs may have been low because of
the pandemic or responses to it. In July 2020 the UK had come out
of lockdown and many supply constraints and travel and commercial
restrictions had been lifted. Nevertheless, perceived health risk is a
candidate explanation for the low reported MPCs. However, we find
little evidence in support of this hypothesis. Our data indicate that few
individuals considered themselves at high risk of infection at the time7
of the survey. Moreover, when we look at the average MPC for those
who consider themselves likely to get COVID, or who have been told
by the authorities to ‘‘shield’’ (for example because of a pre-existing
health condition) we see very modest differences in MPCs.
Another possibility is that either the constraints on spending due to
the first lockdown in the spring of 2020, or policies to support incomes
through the pandemic, increased liquidity among those who might
otherwise have higher MPCs. It is certainly the case that the aggregate
saving rate in the UK rose significantly in the spring of 2020 (Office
for National Statistics, 2020b). However, in other work (Crossley et al.,
2021a) we have shown that the extra saving was concentrated among
affluent individuals and households, whom we would expect to have
low MPCs in any event. Further, our analysis in this paper shows very
little variation in average MPCs between savers and nonsavers in July
2020. In contrast to the U.S., pandemic income support policies in the
U.K. did not focus on direct payments to individuals and households.
There was an increase of £20 per week in Universal Credit (the main
out of work benefit) but the largest expenditure was through the
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (or ‘‘furlough’’ scheme) which was a
wage subsidy aimed at preserving employment relationships. Moreover
we do not find higher MPCs for those who nevertheless lost their jobs.
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Use of amount not spent, Probit marginal effects.
Reduce debt Save Receive less Give more
Female 0.01 0.02 −0.03 −0.04∗ 0.00 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 19–65 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
GCSE or lower 0.00 −0.02 −0.05∗ −0.03 −0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Degree −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02 −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Couple, child 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.01∗ −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Couple, no child 0.00 0.01 −0.03 −0.02 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Single, child 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Home not owned outright 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.05∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01 −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Income q1 0.02 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Income q2 −0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Income q4 −0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Income q5 −0.03 0.03 −0.01∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Hours loss −0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Job loss −0.01 −0.01 0.03 −0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Never saver 0.07∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
New saver 0.01 0.05∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Always saver −0.06∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
In arrears 0.12∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
Expects financial difficulty 0.13∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Shielding −0.02 −0.04 −0.00 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
Likely get COVID −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
Very unlikely get COVID −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 9605 8829 9605 8829 9605 8829 9605 8829
Notes: Presented are marginal effects for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001. Regressions are
weighted for nonresponse. Omitted categories are: male; age 66+; educated to a-level; single with no child; income quintile three; ‘no (labour market) shock’; ‘never saver’; ‘not
in arrears’, ‘0% chance of financial difficulty’, ‘not shielding’ and ‘unlikely to get COVID’. MPCs are calculated on the basis of questions asking if spending would change upon
receipt of £500 and by how much. MPCs are trimmed to be at least zero and at most one. Income quintiles are of household incomes that were collected in 2017-18 (wave 9) and
are equivalised using the OECD modified scale. The variables ‘Labour shock’, ‘arrears’, ‘expects financial difficulties’, ‘COVID shielding’ and ‘expects to get COVID’ are collected
in the July 2020 survey. The ‘Labour shock’ categories are defined according to changes between February and July 2020, where an hours loss is defined as working positive
hours in February and being employed but working zero hours in July. ‘Saver’ categories are defined according to saving behaviour in 2018–19 (wave 10) and July 2020. ‘COVID
shielding’ refers to being identified as someone at risk of severe illness from coronavirus by the NHS. ‘Expects to get COVID’ has a reference period of the next month, while
‘expects financial difficulties’ has a reference period of the next three months.A third possibility is that our low estimates of average MPCs are
due either to something about the sample or the way the question
was asked. There was significant nonresponse to the COVID-19 study.
However, as noted above, the sample is ultimately based on probability
samples, and nonresponse has been very carefully modelled using the
very rich set of observables available form the Main Study. The result-
ing combination of data and inverse-probability weights has been tested
and shown capable of hitting many population targets (including vari-
ables not included in the nonresponse modelling). Moreover, although
the weights do significantly adjust the socio-demographic composition
of the sample, weighting has a very small effect on the average MPC8
(raising it by 1 percentage point). Given that the correction for selection
on a very rich set of observables leads to such a small change in
the average MPC, we conclude that sample selection is not a credible
explanation for our low average MPC. The COVID-19 study asked about
a hypothetical payment of £500 and spending over a three month
horizon. Some previous surveys asked about larger windfalls or longer
time horizons, and size and horizon effects have been documented
in this literature. However, where these effects have been estimated
in a controlled way, they are not large. For example, Fuster et al.
(2021) randomly allocate respondents to hypothetical payments of
$500, $2500, and $5000 and find that going from the smallest to
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only 5 percentage points. Moreover, we think the payment size and
spending horizon in the COVID-19 Study are appropriate to realistic
policy scenarios.
One aspect of the hypothetical spending questions posed in the
COVID-19 Study maybe important. Respondents are first asked about
the extensive margin (whether spending would increase, decrease or
stay the same) and then, if spending would increase or decrease, by
how much. These questions follow the pattern adopted by the New
York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations. In those data, Fuster et al.
(2021) estimate average MPCs at the lower end of the range reported
in the prior literature. Fuster et al. (2021) postulate that this neutral
formulation does not prime respondents to give a positive spending
amount (in contrast to asking directly ‘‘how much would you spend’’).
Finally, a striking feature of our analysis of the hypothetical uses
of unspent windfall income is the strong desire to pay down debt, par-
ticularly among individuals that theory and the prior literature would
suggest should have high MPCs. We find that the desire to pay down
debt is particularly high among single parents, among ‘‘never-savers’’,
among those in arrears, and among those expecting financial difficulties
over the last three months. In other work (Crossley et al., 2021a,b), we
have shown that the economic consequences of the pandemic in the
U.K. tended, at least initially, to exacerbate pre-existing inequalities.
The top of the long-run income distribution increased saving, while the
bottom of the distribution took on debt.
In the end, we think the two most credible explanations for the low
average MPC in these data are the neutral wording of the question,
and the possibility that the economic uncertainties associated with the
pandemic induced a strong desire to deleverage among those at the
bottom of the distribution, and this kept their MPCs low. For now,
these remain hypotheses. We are aware of no randomized test of a
neutral, two-part MPC question against alternatives, and we have no
pre-pandemic baseline data on the desire to deleverage.
Importantly though, in contrast to what has been suggested else-
where (for example, Alon et al. (2020)), we find no evidence that MPCs
were high during the pandemic, at least in the UK. This suggests that
income transfers would not be an effective way to stimulate spending.
Even those who expect financial difficulties in the immediate future,
or anticipate job loss, do not expect to spend the additional payments
over this period, and rather choose to pay off debts. This decision is
despite the relaxation of spending restrictions at the time of the Study.
In addition to paying off debts or saving, the £500 payments induce
changes in private transfers. For those that have not spent all of the
payment, we find that 12% report that their financial transfers would
be affected by the £500 payment, either giving more financial support
to family or receiving less. Single parents and those in the lowest
income quintiles are most likely to receive fewer transfers, in other
words the additional income payment crowds out private support.
Those over 66 or owning their own home are most likely to report that
they would use the payment to give more financial support to friends
or family.
The fact that one-time payments affect transfer behaviour has im-
portant implications for policy. In particular, it means that the aggre-
gate MPC (the amount of a stimulus that is spent) need not be equal
to the average MPC, even if the cash stimulus is distributed equally.
If low MPC individuals (such as older people) pass on some or all of
the stimulus to higher MPC individuals, this can raise the aggregate
MPC above the average. On the other hand, the crowding out of private
transfers will have the opposite effect so that high MPC households re-
ceive less (net of private transfers) than the additional income payment,
and low MPC individuals households receive more. This would reduce
the aggregate MPC. Crowding out of private transfers could also mean
that stimulus payments targeted at groups with high individual MPCs
increase spending less than predicted.
Our data do not allow us to fully characterize how these effects
on transfer payments will translate into the aggregate MPC, but this9
is an important question for future research. Nevertheless, given the
modest fraction whose transfers change, and the very low MPCs across
all groups in our data, the aggregate MPC, like the average MPC, was
likely to be very low through this crisis.
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